Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John
,. 
Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets 
Jeffrey S. Banks 
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, CA 91125 
John Duggan 
Department of Political Science 
and Department of Economics 
University of Rochester 
Rochester, NY 14627 
April 16, 2001 
------- -----
Abstract 
We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible 
strategy profiles is compact and convex but possibly non-rectangular. 
Thus, a player's feasible strategies may depend on the strategies used 
by others, as in Debreu's (1952, 1982) generalized games. In contrast 
to the model of Debreu, we do not require preferences to be defined 
over infeasible strategy profiles, and we do not require a player's fea-
sible strategy correspondence to have non-empty values. We prove 
existence of Nash equilibria under a lower hemicontinuity condition, 
and we give examples of classes of games in which this condition is 
satisfied. 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in games in which 
the set of feasible strategy profiles is a compact and convex subset of finite-
dimensional Euclidean space. In particular, we allow the set of strategies 
feasible for one player to depend on the strategies adopted by others. In 
addition to compactness and convexity, we assume that the payoff functions 
of the players are continuous and quasi-concave and that each player's feasible 
strategy correspondence, essentially "slices" from the set of feasible profiles, 
is lower hemicontinuous. We verify that this condition is satisfied if the set 
of feasible strategy profiles is strictly convex or is a simplex, as when profiles 
correspond to allocations of a fixed resource across a finite number of uses. 
Our interest in the issue of strategic dependence in games stems from two 
observations. First, some situations are most parsimoniously modelled in a 
way that involves such dependence. A group of oil producers, for example, 
cannot decide independently how much oil to pump from a common well, 
because the total amount pumped cannot exceed the amount of oil in the 
ground. In the realm of politics, a committee may be able to influence 
spending on a particular program but, if the total budget is constrained, not 
independently of the decisions of other committees. More generally, each 
committee may be able to influence some dimension of social policy, which is 
subject to convex fiscal, technological, or legal constraints. Second, models 
that allow for strategic dependence can be useful as analytic devices, as in the 
proof of existence of competitive equilibrium (see Arrow and Debreu (1954)) 
or of an "issue-by-issue median" (see Kramer (1972) and Shepsle (1979)). 
Of course, we are not original in taking up the question of existence in 
this setting. Debreu (1952, 1982) allows for strategic dependence in devel-
oping the framework of generalized games. As well, Rosen (1965) permits 
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dependence in his study of "concave" games. An advantage of our approach 
is that, unlike Debreu and Rosen, we only need preferences defined on the set 
of feasible strategy profiles, and not on profiles that could never actually ob-
tain. Unlike Debreu, we take the set of feasible strategy profiles (rather than 
feasible response correspondences) as primitive. Thus, our conditions for 
equilibrium existence do not concern a player's responses to infeasible com-
binations of strategies. Unlike Rosen, who assumes preferences have concave 
numerical representations, we use only quasi-concavity. 
After introducing our model and establishing conditions for equilibrium 
existence, we end by relating our result to this earlier work in terms of the 
assumptions on preferences and strategy sets. 
2 The Environment 
Let N = { 1, ... , n} denote the set of players, with a strategy for player i being 
represented by an element Si of Wmi, i = 1, ... , n, with s = (s1 , ... , sn) E 
~m denoting a strategy profile and m = l:mi. (Throughout the paper, 
superscripts will index players, and subscripts will index dimensions in wm ') 
Feasible strategy profiles lie in the set S ~ Wm, where S is assumed to be 
non-empty, compact, and convex. The set S determines for each i E N a 
correspondence P: S ~~ S identifying the feasible changes in a profile s 
that player i can induce: 
h c E S -i - ( i i-1 i+I n) Alt t. 1 . w ere, 1or any s , s - s , ... , s , s , ... , s . erna 1ve y, given 
the Euclidean structure of the strategy spaces, we can write this as 
F(s) = {t ES It= s + L Ajej, Aj E ~}, 
jEdi 
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where d,i denotes the "dimensions" of S under i's control, and, for all j E di, 
ej is the usual basis vector for the jth dimension. 
From the assumptions on S, we know that, for all i EN and alls ES, the 
set pi(s) is non-empty, compact, and convex; furthermore, pi is an upper 
hemicontinuous correspondence: for all s E S and all open V ~ Rm such 
that pi(s) ~ V, there exists an open U ~Rm such thats EU and t E UnS 
implies pi(t) ~ V. This follows since S is compact and the graph of pi 
is evidently closed (see Border (1985), Theorem 11.9). To this we add the 
assumption that pi is lower hemicontinuous (LHC): for all s E S and all 
open V ~ ~m such that pi(s) n V -=/:- 0, there exists an open [f ~ ~m such 
thats EU and t EU n S implies pi(t) n V-=/:- 0. In Section 4, we show that 
the latter assumption is non-trivial. 
As for preferences, each i E N has a continuous utility function Ui: S -. R 
that is quasi-concave on pi ( s) for all s E S. 
3 The Existence Result 
We extend the definition of Nash equilibrium to our environment rn the 
obvious way. 
Definition: A Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile s* E S such that, for 
all i EN and alls E P(s*), ui(s*) 2'.: ui(s). 
Theorem: There exists a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: For all i E N, let bi(s) = arg maxtEFi(s) ui(t) denote i's best feasible 
responses at s. By the Maximum Theorem, the above assumptions on ui and 
pi imply that the correspondence bi: S -- S is upper hemicontinuous and 
non-empty-, compact-, and convex-valued. Following the steps of Kramer 
(1972) (who showed the existence of a dimension-by-dimension median in a 
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spatial voting environment), define the correspondence B: S --+--+ S by 
B(s) = ! L bi(s) 
n iEN 
{ t E S I t = ! L ti and ti E bi ( s) for all i E N}. 
n iEN 
Thus, elements of B(s) are (equally-weighted) convex combinations of in-
dividual best responses to s. Since each bi is upper hemicontinuous and 
non-empty-, compact-, and convex-valued, so is B (see Border (1985), Theo-
rem 11.27). Therefore, Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem yields the existence 
of a strategy profile s* such that s* E B ( s*). 
To see thats* constitutes a Nash equilibrium, note thats* E B(s*) implies 
that s* can be written 
s* ! 2: ti 
n iEN 
! 2:[s* + L ,\jej] 
n iEN jEdi 
for some {>.k}k=l' where ti = s* + L:jEdi Ajej E bi(s*) for all i E N. Simpli-
fying, 
s* s* +!LL ,\jej 
n iEN jEdi 
1 m 
s* + - L Akek, 
n k=I 
which implies L:k=I Akek = 0. Since the basis vectors are linearly indepen-
dent, ,\k = 0 for all k = 1, ... , m. Thus, s* E bi(s*) for all i E N, ands* is a 
Nash equilibrium. 
4 Lower Hemicontinuity 
One of the advantages of the above formulation is that we can inspect S 
directly to verify whether LHC holds, without reference to a player's feasible 
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responses to infeasible combinations of strategies. If S is "rectangular," i.e., 
S = S1 x · · · x Sm, then pi is a constant correspondence and so satisfies LHC 
(giving the usual Nash existence result). 
Next, we give two conditions on S sufficient for LHC, both of which are 
independent of how the dimensions of S are assigned to the players. Thus, 
in the remainder of this section, let i and di be an arbitrary player and 
subset of {l, ... , m}, respectively. Let N(s, E) denote the open ball of radius 
E centered at s, and let riS denote the relative interior of S (the interior of 
S when considered as a subset of affS, the affine hull of S). 
Claim 1: Let S be strictly convex: s, t E S, s =f. t, and o: E (0, 1) imply 
as+ (1 - o:)t E riS; then pi is lower hemicontinuous. 
Proof: Lett E pi(s) n V, with V open. 
(1) t = s. Let U = V. For alls' EU n S, s' E Pi(s'), sos' E Fi(s') n V. 
(2) t =f. s. Let z(o:) =as+ (1 - o:)t, o: E (0, l); then z(o:) E pi(s) (since 
s, t E pi(s) and Pi(s) is convex); z(o:) E riS (by strict convexity); and, for 
o: close to zero, z(o:) E V (since V is open). Choose one such o:, and set 
z = z(o:). Take E > 0 such that N(z, E) ~ V and N(z, E) n affS ~ riS. Let 
u = N(s, E). Fors' Eu ns, z+s' -s E N(z, E) ~ V. Also, z+ s' -s E affS, 
and so z + s' - s E riS; in particular, z + s' - s ES. Since z-i = s-i (which 
is implied by z E pi(s)), it follows that (z-s)-i = 0, i.e., z+s'-s E pi(s'). 
Thus, pi(s') n V =f. 0. 
Hence, any strictly convex set of feasible strategy profiles will possess a 
Nash equilibrium. 
Claim 2: Let S be a polytope, the convex hull of a finite set of vectors; then 
pi is lower hemicontinuous. 
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Proof: We can write Sas the (bounded) polyhedron 
S = { X E ~m I pi · X ~ d, j = 1, ... , l}, 
where the l vectors pi E ~m and scalars d are fixed. Let t E pi ( s) n V, with 
V open. Partition {1, 2, ... , l} into two sets, J1 and J2 , as follows: 
11 {j I ii · ( s - t) =t o} 
12 {j I p1 · (s - t) = O}. 
Take any j E 11 (since Sis bounded, this set is non-empty), so that pi ·s ~ d 
and pi · t ~ d, at least one inequality strict. Then, for all a E (0, 1), 
pi· (as+ (1 - a)t) > d. Since V is open, there exists a1 E (0, 1) close 
enough to zero so that a1s + (1 - a1)t EV. Let a*= minjeJi a1, and define 
r* = a*s + (1-a*)t. Thus, r* EV and, for all j E li,pi · r* > d. Let V* be 
an open subset of V containing r* such that, for all s' E V* and all j E 11 , 
pi· s' > d. Define U = V* + (s - r*), an open set containing s. 
We claim that s' E Sn U implies Fi(s') n V :f 0. Specifically, we claim 
thats'+ (r* - s) ES n V. (It follows thats'+ (r* - s) E Fi(s').) To show 
s' + ( r* - s) E S, take any j. If j E 11 then s' E U implies s' + r* - s E V* 
and, by construction, pi · ( s' + r* - s) > d. If j E 12 then 
pi · ( s' + r* - s) pi · s' + (1 - a*)pi · (t - s) 
pi. s' 
> d. 
Thus, s' + (r* - s) E S. Finally, s' + (r* - s) E V follows from s' E U = 
V* + (s-r*) and V* ~ V. 
If S is a simplex, therefore, as when the issue at hand is the allocation of 
a limited resource across a finite number of uses, a Nash equilibrium exists. 
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On the other hand, it is not the case that all compact and convex S give 
rise to lower hemicontinuous pi correspondences. The following example 
demonstrates that Claims 1 and 2 cannot be generalized to allow for curves 
and flat spots simultaneously. 
Example 1: Let n = 2, m1 = 2, and m2 = 1. We let player 1 control 
the first two dimensions and player 2 the third dimension of R3 . The set S, 
depicted below, is the convex hull of a half-circle in the s3 = 0 plane, with 
highest point (0, 1, 0), and the point (0, 1, 1). 
[Figure 1 here.] 
Let s = (0, 1, 0), so (0, 1, 1) E F 2 (s). Taking an open ball of radius 1/2 
around (0, 1, 1), we claim that there is no open set U around s satisfying 
F 2 (s') n N(s, 1/2) ¥- 0 for all s' E Un S. To see this, consider the sequence 
{ sk} converging to s along the edge of the half-circle. For each k, F 2 ( sk) = 
{ sk}, and therefore F 2 (sk) n N(s, 1/2) = 0. 
5 Related Literature 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Debreu (1952, 1982) and Rosen (1965) 
obtain Nash equilibrium existence results under assumptions different than 
ours. As here, Rosen starts with a compact and convex set S of feasible 
strategy profiles, where now pi denotes the projection of S onto the dimen-
sions in Rm associated with player i, and P = P1 x · · · x pn. Rather than 
assuming lower hemicontinuity of the individual feasibility correspondences, 
Rosen assumes preferences are defined over all of P, a superset of S, and are 
represented by a continuous and concave utility function. This strengthen-
ing of quasi-concavity to concavity is important in the proof, for there the 
fact that the sum of concave functions is concave is used (whereas the sum 
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of quasi-concave functions is not necessarily quasi-concave). Furthermore, 
there exist quasi-concave functions without concave representations (see Ar-
row and Endoven (1961), Kannai (1977), or Sundaram (1996)). Finally, even 
the quasi-concave extension of preferences from S to Pis not without loss of 
generality, as the following example shows. 
Example 2: As a first step, suppose n = 2, m1 = 1, m 2 = 1, and S is the 
unit square in 3t2. Give player 1 the utility function u1(s1, s2) = y'sl + s2. 
Thus, l's indifference curves are quasi-linear with infinite slope along the 
vertical axis (when s1 = 0). Now redefine Sand u1 by rotating the above set 
(with indifference curves) by 45 degrees, as illus~rated in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 here.] 
We claim that, for this newly defined environment, player l's preferences 
cannot be extended to a convex weak order on P. To see this, suppose 
otherwise and consider strategies s, s', and tin Figure 2. By construction, s 
is preferred to s', and, by convexity, s is preferred to t. Then, by continuity, 
there exists a strategy t' between t and s close enough to t so that t' is 
preferred to s'. But this violates convexity. 
Debreu (1982) maintains the assumption that quasi-concave utility func-
tions are defined on P and takes feasible strategy correspondences defined 
on P as primitives for all players.1 While he allows the set of feasible strat-
egy profiles to be non-convex, he assumes these correspondences are lower 
hemicontinuous with non-empty values. Formally, Debreu begins with non-
empty, compact, and convex sets, Ai ~ 3tmi, of "conceivable" strategies for 
each i EN, and he posits feasibility correspondences, ft'i: IThENAh -+-+Ai, 
assumed to be non-empty-, compact-, and convex-valued and continuous. 
10ur result is compared more easily to Debreu's (1982) simplified version of his earlier 
existence result. 
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The set S of jointly feasible strategy profiles are then given by the fixed 
points of the product correspondence P = F1 x · · · x Pn, or 
S = {s E IThENAh I si E F(s) for all i EN}. 
While Sneed not be convex, preferences need to be defined on all of IThENAh, 
and hence on infeasible strategy profiles. Furthermore, because Pi has non-
empty values, feasible responses to infeasible combinations of others' strate-
gies must be specified. Suppose, for example, that n = 3, that m 1 = m 2 = 
m 3 = 1, and that S = {x E ~!I L:xi = 1}, where each player i makes a 
demand si; then F1 must specify at least one feasible strategy for player 1 
when faced with the incompatible demands s2 = s3 = 1. 
Denote by "q-extension" the requirement that quasi-concave utility func-
tions are defined on P, by "c-extension" the requirement that concave utility 
functions are defined on P, and by "non-emptiness" the requirement that 
non-empty-valued feasible strategy correspondences are defined on P. The 
next table lists the various requirements of Debreu (1982), Rosen (1965), and 
the current paper. 
Debreu Rosen this paper 
q-extension • • 
non-emptiness • 
c-extension • 
LHC • • 
convex S • • 
Thus, we add convexity of S in place of Debreu's q-extension and non-
emptiness conditions, and we add lower hemicontinuity in place of Rosen's 
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assumptions on utility functions. We have not found an example of equilib-
rium non-existence when just one of our conditions is deleted. It is evident, 
however, that the demands on such an example would be exceptional: if 
convexity of S were satisfied, LHC (by our theorem) and c-extension (by 
Rosen's) would be violated; if LHC were satisfied, convexity of S (by our 
theorem) and q-extension (by Debreu's) would be violated. 
Finally, Gale and Mas-Colell (1975) and Schafer and Sonnenschein (1975) 
have extended Debreu's original existence result to environments with non-
ordered preferences. In particular, preferences over strategy profiles may 
be incomplete and, therefore, may have no numerical representation. This 
generality does not allow q-extension to be dropped completely, however, 
because preferences over infeasible strategy profiles are still needed in some 
situations. Because preferences are assumed to have open graph, if one profile 
s on the boundary of S is strictly preferred to another profile s' on the 
boundary, some infeasible profiles must be preferred to others. 
References 
[1] K. Arrow and G. Debreu (1954) Existence of an equilibrium for a com-
petitive economy, Econometrica, 22:265-290. 
[2] K. Arrow and A. Endoven (1961) Quasi-concave prbgramming, Econo-
metrica, 29:779--800. 
[3] K. Border (1985) Fixed Point Theorems, New York: Cambridge. 
[4] G. Debreu (1952) A social equilibrium existence theorem, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 38:886-893. 
10 
[5] G. Debreu (1982) Existence of competitive equilibrium, Handbook of 
Mathematical Economics, vol. 2, K. Arrow and M. Intrilligator, ed.s, 
New York: North-Holland. 
[6] D. Gale and A. Mas-Colell (1975) An equilibrium existence theorem for 
a general model without ordered preferences, Journal of Mathematical 
Econmomics, 2:9-15. 
[7] Y. Kannai (1977) Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility 
functions, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 4:1-56. 
[8] G. Kramer (1972) Sophisticated voting over multi-dimensional choice 
spaces, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 2:165-180. 
[9] J. Rosen (1965) Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for con-
cave n-person games, Econometrica, 33:520-534. 
[10] W. Schafer and H. Sonnenschein (1975) Equilibrium m abstract 
economies without ordered preferences, Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, 2:345-348. 
[11] K. Shepsle (1979) Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in mul-
tidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science, 
23:27-59. 
[12] R. Sundaram (1996) A First Course in Optimization Theory, New York: 
Cambridge. 
11 
~-------·----~---------£ 
'·,,,"" 
.... 
··· .... ~ 
....... 
I 
I 
~ ..... 
I 
I 
I 
I 
------------·--·----+--
s 
I 
d~ L ___ -
$ I$ 
• 1-I -----~ 
t 
WP#ll 
WP#l2 
WP#l3 
WP#14 
WP#15 
WP#16 
WP#17 
WP#18 
WP#19 
WP#20 
WP#21 
W. ALLEN WALLIS INSTITUTE OF POLffiCAL ECONOMY 
1998 - 2001 Working Paper Series 
University of Rochester 
107 Harkness Hall 
Rochester, NY 14627 
"Welfare Policy and Endogenous Selective Norms," 
Bird, Edward J., January 1998. 
"Does the Welfare State Induce Risk-Taking?," 
Bird, Edward J., February 1998. 
"Politics, Altruism, and the Definition of Poverty," 
Bird, Edward J., February 1998. 
"Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," 
Banks, Jeffiey S., John Duggan, and Michel Le Breton, March 1998. 
"Interpretation and Coordination in Constitutional Politics" 
Randall L. Calvert and James Johnson, July 1998 
"Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities" 
Randall L. Calvert and Nathan Dietz, July 1998 
"Establishing Cooperation Without Pre-Play Communication" 
Randall L. Calvert. July 1998 
"A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries" 
John Duggan and Cesar Martinelli, November 1998 
"Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates" 
John Duggan and Mark Fey, February 2001 
"Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets" 
Jeffiey Banks and John Duggan, May 2001 
"Non-cooperative Games Among Groups" 
John Duggan, May 2001 
